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     Although urban location of firms is better analyzed by two-dimensional space, it is 
usually examined by one-dimensional space in the literature on spatial competition a la 
Hotelling (1929) due to mathematical tractability. However, observing urban areas in the 
real world, we hardly find long narrow (one-dimensional) cities. Similarly in differentiated 
product space, we seldom find commodities which can be depicted only by single 
characteristic. The one-dimensional approximation may not be accepted unless we obtain 
equivalent results. To investigate the validity is one of the purposes of this paper. 
     In studying spatial competition of oligopolistic firms, we must be faced with a 
troublesome obstacle of the nonexistence of Nash price equilibrium . That is to say, as 
shown by d'Aspremont, Gabszewitz and Thisse (1979), there exists no price equilibrium in 
one-dimensional space under a linear transportation cost when duopolists locate close. 
Later, Champsaur and Rochet (1988) revealed that so as to guarantee the existence of a 
price equilibrium in pure strategies, we have to limit a family of transportation cost 
function substantially.' Without existence of price equilibrium for all locational pairs
, 
payoff functions of the firms are not defined globally, which prevents us from knowing the 
overall locational behavior of the firms. 
     A similar argument applies for the Nash location game under a fixed price. It is 
well known that there exists no location equilibrium in pure strategies when the market is 
a line segment or a disc, and the number of firms is three (Shaked, 1975) although they 
tend to locate around the center. 
     These findings imply that unless firms are allowed to take mixed strategies, both 
price equilibrium and location equilibrium exist under a very limited set of the number of 
firms, transportation cost functions, and consumer distribution functions. Needless to say, 
in analyzing multistage games, existence of these equilibria is necessary. In this paper, 
therefore, we will presuppose duopolistic firms, a quadratic transportation cost, and 
uniform rectangular distributions of consumers. The first two are frequently appeared in 
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the literature as they together ensure the existence of price equilibrium in one-dimensional 
space. The last one is uncommon and is an extension of one-dimensional to 
two-dimensional distribution of consumers. A conversion method we developed here will 
enable us to explore the two-dimensional world maintaining the existence of price 
equilibrium. The method is applied to any convex set of uniform consumer distributions 
given a quadratic transportation cost and two firms. 
     We deal with subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. That is, we consider a situation 
that two firms compete in location in the first stage anticipating the subsequent price 
competition in the second stage. The locations cannot be altered in the second stage. In 
the context of spatial competition, such a change in location is seldom done due to 
irreversible nature of urban building capital. In characteristics competition, such a change 
in model type is usually very costly because of existence of scale economies in production. 
     We also analyze sequential entry of firms with simultaneous price competition. 
Specifically, one firm enters the spatial market in the first stage, the other firm enters the 
market in the second stage, and then they compete in price in the final stage. In other 
words, the former two stages are a Stackelberg location game while the latter stage is a 
Nash price game. A comparison is made between this sequential ocation model with the 
simultaneous location model. 
     Our emphasis is placed upon the difference between one-dimensional and 
two-dimensional problems. According to d'Aspremont et al. (1979), the principle of 
maximal differentiation holds in one-dimensional space. However, we shall demonstrate 
that this is not true in two-dimensional space. If the space is rectangular, then firms do 
not locate at opposite corners, but at midpoints of opposite sides, implying that 
differentiation is maximal in one dimension whereas it is minimal in the other dimension. 
Neven and Thisse (1990) obtained a similar esult by assuming horizontal differentiation 
one dimension and vertical differentiation in the other dimension. Here, we assume two 
dimensions of horizontal differentiation, where no a priori difference exists between the
3
two. 
     The paper is organized as follows. The two-stage location price game is briefly 
depicted in Section 2, and a conversion method between one-dimensional non-uniform 
distributions' of consumers and two-dimensional uniform distributions of consumers i  
stated in Section 3. 
     After solving the second-stage Nash price game, we concentrate on the first-stage 
Nash location game for rectangular distributions ofconsumers in Section 4. In Section 5, 
we modify the Nash location game to a Stackelberg location game in the first stage while 
the second stage of the Nash price game remains the same. Section 6 makes a welfare 
comparison between the Nash location equilibrium in Section 4 and the Stackelberg 
location equilibrium in Section 5. Section 7then concludes the paper. 
2. THE MODEL SETTING 
     Consumers who purchase a unit of good are uniformly distributed over a convex set 
c on U 2, where j dxdy=l. Anticipating consequences of the second-stage competition, 
firm 1 locates at '(xl,yl)EC and firm 2' locates at (x2,y2)EC, in the first stage. They are not 
allowed to locate outside C due to, say a zoning regulation or a geographic constraint . In 
the second stage, they choose their own mill price pl and p2 respectively holding the 
locations fixed. The transportation cost which a consumer has to incur is assumed to be a 
quadratic function of distance between the consumer and the nearer firm. 
     Suppose the unit transportation cost is unity without loss of generality, a marginal 
consumer at (x,y) is indifferent be ween firms 1and 2, where 
       p1 + (x1x)2 + (y1,Y)2 =p2 + (x2x)2 + (Y2Y)2~ 1                                 () 
which is always a straight line. 
     Assuming zero production cost again without loss of generality, each firm maximizes 
its profit: 
         IIl = p1 Dl, 11 2= p2(1-Dl) (2) 
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with respect to location and then price, where D1=J 
1 dxdy, and 
C1={(x,y.)EC I p1+(x1 x)2+(y1 y)2 < p2+(x2 x)2+(y2y)2}. Note that the measure of 
the boundary is nil, and so ignored. 
     The analysis is confined to the case of pure strategies. In order to get the subgame 
perfect equilibrium, we first solve the second-stage problem of profit maximization with 
respect to price given the locations. As we assume that the transportation cost is a 
quadratic function of distance and C is a convex set, we can employ the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1(Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991) 
     For any given locations of firms and for any log-concave density function of 
consumers in ERn, a unique Nash price equilibrium exists. 
     From this, it follows that any convex set. of C in IR2 guarantees the existence of a 
unique price equilibrium. It should be noted that Proposition 1is not applicable when the 
transportation cost is linear. Although the demand becomes continuous in two dimensions 
under the linear transportation cost, the profit function is not necessarily quasi-concave, 
which may not guarantee the existence ofa unique price equilibrium (Economides, 1986). 
We will focus only on this set in the reminder of the paper. 
3. CONVERSION FROM TWO DIMENSIONNAL TO ONE-DIMENSIONAL SPACE 
     The quadratic transportation cost not only ensures the existence of price 
equilibrium, but also generates a straight line division of the market. This enables us to 
convert a two-dimensional uniform distribution of consumers into a one-dimensional 
non-uniform distribution of consumers, which greatly eases analysis. Notice that so as to 
obtain the best locational reply in the first stage, we must consider any pair of firm
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locations, for which the log-concavity should be satisfied after projecting the 
two-dimensional distribution onto one-dimensional one. We show below that the uniform 
distribution over a convex set on R2 is a sufficient condition for the concave distribution i
ER. In other words, if we project he uniform distribution of consumers over a convex set on 
[R2 at any angle (i.e., for any pair of firm locations), the distribution always becomes 
concave in IR guaranteeing a unique price equilibrium. 
     Specifically, under the assumptions in the previous section, let us set the new axis, 
called X axis, parallel to the line passing through the two firms' locations, (xl,yl) and 
(x2,y2) as drawn in Figure 1. Then, the market split line segment $M, which is equation 
(1), becomes perpendicular to the X axis. Due to the nature of the quadratic distance cost, 
all consumers at the same X are considered i entical to the firms. That is, we can project 
the two-dimensional convex set of the uniform distribution of consumers onto the X axis, 
so that it becomes a one-dimensional on uniform concave distribution of consumers.
[Figure 1 about here]
     Mathematically, define a convex set of two-dimensional uniform distribution of 
consumers as (={(X,Y)EIR2 1 g(X,Y)<O} in the X-Y coordinates. Thedemand is measured 
by the one-dimensional fu ction as D1=f 
1 hl(X) h2(X) dX, where Y=h1(X) and 
Y=h2(X) [hl(X)>h2(X)] are two implicit functions derived from the boundary g(X,Y)=O. 
In Figure 1, Y=hl(X) is the arc ABC, Y=h2(X) isthe arc ADC, and Dl is the shaded 
area. Since ( is convex, hl(X) is concave and h2(X) is convex, and hence hl(X)h2(X) is 
concave. We can therefore work with the model of one-dimensional concave distribution 
of consumers, where Proposition 1 applies. 
     Now, let f(X) denote the concave density function of consumers in one-dimensional 
space and F(X) be the cumulative distribution function of consumers, where
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X 
F(X)=j X f(Z)dZ and F(X)=1. Notice hat D1=F(X1). 
     By use of (1) and (2), the first-order conditions for profit maximization with 
respect to its own price are given by 
                                                    A A 
       8111 A p1f(X) 8112 A P2f(X) 
            FX = -                           0, = 1-F(X) 0. (3) 
      8p1 2(X2 X1) 8p2 2(X2 X1) 
Solving these two equations with (1), we have 
                 A A A X +X2] A 
              G(X) = 2F(X) - 1 + X - 1 f(X) = 0. (4) 
2 
A From Proposition 1, equation (4) determines a unique market boundary X in Nash price 
equilibrium for any concave distribution of consumers, given locations of X1 and X2. 
4: NASH LOCATION GAME 
     We will prove in this section that two firms never locate at the interior region in 
any rectangular distribution, where consumers are uniformly distributed. We shall fully 
identify Nash location equilibria for any rectangular distribution of consumers, and analyze 
Stackelberg location equilibrium in the next section. A welfare comparison of these 
equilibria are made in Section 6. 
     We know from Proposition 1 that since rectangles are convex, for any location pair 
there always exists a unique price equilibrium in the second-stage competition. We shall 
therefore focus our analysis only upon the first-stage location equilibrium hereafter. Firm i 
maximizes Il i (xi)yi, x
,,yj) with respect o xi,yi for i# j, knowing the subsequent price 
competition with perfect foresight. It should be noted that although each profit function is 
quasi-concave with respect to its price for any concave density (Proposition 1), it is not 
necessarily quasi-concave with respect to its location. This forces us to examine only a 
limited family of consumer distributions since we cannot investigate the subgame perfect 
equilibrium without existence of price equilibrium and location equilibrium.
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     In the beginning, consider a uniform distribution of consumers over a rectangle 
whose lengths of sides are c by 1/c: C1={(x,y)EIR2 ( 0<x<c, 0<y<1/c}. Without loss of 
generality, assume 0<x1<x2<c and 0<yl<y2<1/c. Define xa such that (X WO) is on the 
market split line of equation (1); xb such that (xb,1/c) is on (1); ya such that (0,ya) is on 
(1); and yb such that (c,yb) is on (1). Notice that the line of (1) is at right angles to the 
line passing through (xi,yi) and (x2,y2), whose slope is (y2 yl)/(x2 x1)-a. In Figure 2, 
this is shown by the dotted line while the market boundary is the solid line. Depending 
upon the values of xa, xb, ya and yb, divisions of the rectangular market are classified into 
four cases as in Figure 2(i), 2(ii)7 2(iii) and 2(iv).
[Figure 2about here]
     So as to obtain the Nash equilibrium, we start from the set of Lemmas. All proofs 
are relegated to^ the Appendix.
Lemma 1 
     Given firm j's location of (x.,yj)EC1, firm i(# j) locates either at a corner 
midpoint of one side.
or at a
     Lemma 1 implies that at least one of the duopolist does not choose the interior 
region of C1. Since there are four corners and four sides on a rectangle, there exist eight 
possible locations for one duopolist in this game. Due to symmetry of rectangles, however, 
it suffices to analyze only two possible locations of firm 1: (0,0) and (0,1/2c), where 
CE(0,m). The best locational reply of firm 2 against firm l's location (0,0) is analyzed in 
Lemma 2, and that against firm l's location (0,1/2c) is examined in Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 2
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     If one firm locates at a corner, then the other firm locates at a midpoint of one side 
which is farthest from the corner. 
Lemma 3 
     If one firm locates at a midpoint of one side, then the other firm locates at one of 
three other midpoint. More precisely, given the firm 1's location of (0,1/2c), firm 2 locates 
at (c/2,0) or (c/2,1/c) if c < co, and locates at (c,1/2c) if c>co, where co= 3/-,13 = 0.798. 
     We thus showed in Lemmas 2 and 3 that the best locational reply to a corner or a 
midpoint is a midpoint. These results will lead to Proposition 2 demonstrating the location 
of midpoints of opposite sides. Before moving to Proposition 2, let us examine economic 
implications of Lemma 3. 
     Suppose c lies within the interval of ((1/3)1/4)c
o)N(0.76,0.80). Given the firm 1's 
location of (0,1/2c), firm 2 chooses to locate at (c/2,0) or (c/2,1/c) rather than the 
opposite midpoint (c,1/2c) from Lemma 3. The distance between the two firms in the 
former two cases (1+c /2c) is smaller than that in the latter case (c/2), and the firm 2's 
share in the former two cases ((5+c4)/12) is smaller than that in the latter case (1/2). 
Apparently, such a closer location may intensify price competition a d reduces the share, it 
seems irrational locational behavior under one-dimensional uniform distributions of 
consumers. 
     However, such behavior does take place in two-dimensional (or one-dimensional 
non uniform) distributions as a rational ocational reply. The reason is intuitively 
understood if we compare the number of marginal consumers in the above example. The 
number of marginal consumers in the former two cases turns out to be less than that in the 
latter case because the ratio of the former to the latter. c 1+c is less than unity for all 
cE((1/3)1/4,c0). When the number of marginal consumers becomes smaller, firms would 
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not lower prices to acquire additional marginal consumers. 
to increase the revenue from non-marginal consumers. 
obtain the following.
 They would rather raise prices 
Examining such possibility, we
Remark 1 
     Relaxing price competition 
consumers becomes smaller.
is possible by locating closer if thenumber o f marginal
     Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 2 
location equilibrium in two-dimensional space.
which fully characterizes the Nash
Proposition 2 
     If C is a rectangle close to a square, then firms locate at the opposite midpoints o f
short or long sides. Otherwise, firms locate at the opposite midpoints o f the short sides. 
     More precisely, the two-stage Nash equilibrium locations are given by 
      (x1,yl,x2,y2) _ (c/2,0,c/2,1/c) for c<co, 
               = (c/2,0,c/2,1/c) or (0,1/2c,c,1/2c) for c
o<c<1, 
where c0L-0.798. 
     In brief, Proposition 2 implies in a context of product characteristics space that 
firms tend to maximize product differentiation in one characteristic (location of each side) 
while they minimize it in the other characteristic (location at a center of each side). Note 
that product differentiation is not maximal. Moreover, when the rectangle is close or equal 
to a square, there exist two location equilibria; and when the rectangle is long and slender, 
there exists a unique location equilibrium.2 Firms succeed in relaxing price competition by-
locating apart each other in the latter case, but not necessarily in the former case. 
Nonetheless, we will show in the next section that if firms enter the market sequentially 
                                10
rather than simultaneously, they always succeed to locate apart. 
     Proposition 2 also implies that neither firm locates at the interior region in Nash 
equilibrium. Needless to say, the non interior equilibrium location is a necessary 
consequence of dominance of the price competition over the location one.3 Rational firms 
move apart each other to avoid cutthroat competition.
5. STACKELBERG LOCATION GAME 
     While the model in Section 4 is simultaneous choice of location, here it is modified 
to sequential choice o f location, i.e., the first stage is a Stackelberg leader follower location 
game while the second stage is a Nash price subgame. 
    Mathematically, firm 1 (the leader) maximizes its profit of B1(x1,y1,x2,y2) with 
respect to x1 and y1, replacing x2 and y2 with firm 2's (the follower's) reply functions 
x2=Rx(x1,y1) and y2=Ry(x1,y1), which are derived from the maximization of 
112(x1,y1,x2,y2) with respect to x2 and y2. 
     In seeking the Stackelberg - location and Nash price equilibrium, we take the 
following logical steps. In general, there are three kinds of firm locations: the midpoint, 
corner or inside. However, we know from Lemma 1 that firm 2, the follower, locates either 
at the midpoint or the corner. In Lemma 5 below, we prove that firm 2 always locates only 
at the midpoint. Based upon this, we examine the behavior of firm 1, the leader, and show 
that it necessarily locates at the midpoint of the short side. Let us begin with Lemma 4 as 
preliminary arrangements for subsequent analysis.
Lemma 4 
    For x1<x2 and y1<y2, the following inequalities hold: 
              arI*ii aII*ii                1 
>0, 1 0 for y2> 1 ' 
               ax2 ay2 2c
(5)
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                    arI*iv aII*iv                      1 >0
, 1 >0, (6) 
                   ax2 ay2 
where the Roman umerals at the superscripts correspond tothose in the proof of Lemma 1. 
     Lemma 4 means that for firm 2, the follower, the midpoint is the best locational 
reply in case (ii), and the corner is the best locational reply in case (iv). On the other 
hand, firm 1, the leader, may locate at the midpoint, the corner or inside. For example, it 
might be possible for firm 1 to locate inside C1 anticipating that firm 2 would locate at the 
most distant corner [case (i) in Figure 2]. In Lemma 5, however, we are able to exclude 
such possibility since the corner location is shown to be a suboptimal locational reply for 
firm 2.
Lemma 5 
     The second entrant chooses to locate at the midpoint of one side. 
     The outline of the proof is as follows. From Lemma 1, the midpoint and the corner 
are the only two candidates for firm 2's location. Knowing this, firm 1 necessarily locates 
at the midpoint in the former case, where case (ii) applies. In the latter case, firm 1 may 
locate inside, where case (iv) applies with permutation of firm indices. Computing the 
maximum profit of firm 1 in each case, the former profit is shown to be larger, which leads 
to the midpoint location of firm 2. 
     By use of Lemma 5, we are now ready to establish Proposition 5 below: 
Proposition 3 
     Each firm locates at a point of the short side in two-stage Stackelberg location and 
Nash price equilibrium.
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     Thus, with the exception that C1 is a square, we observe that the Stackelberg 
location equilibrium is always unique whereas the Nash location equilibrium is not when 
cE[co,1/co]. In other words, the sequential location eliminates one of the multiple 
equilibria, where the firm's profit is lower. This is because firm 1 is able to relax the price 
competition by choosing the midpoint of the short side. Such behavior cannot be possible 
in the Nash simultaneous location game since there is no leader follower distribution 
between the firms. 
     The profit of each firm in Stackelberg location equilibrium is then greater than or 
equal to that in Nash location equilibrium. Consequently, we conclude that firms may be 
worse off if they choose to locate simultaneously rather than sequentially. It should be 
noticed that such difference does not arise in one-dimensional uniform distribution of 
consumers.
6. WELFARE COMPARISON 
     Let us finally conduct a welfare comparison of the above subgame perfect 
equilibrium locations and the social optimal locations. In the absence of the production 
costs and the price elasticity, we can evaluate the social welfare solely by the sum of the 
total transportation costs incurred by consumers who are uniformly distributed on a 
rectangle ofc by 1/c. 
     The welfare loss, defined by the sum of quadratic distance costs between consumers 
and their nearest firms,4 is expressed as 
2 
                   E ff (xi X)2+(Yi Y)2dxdy, (7)' 
                      i=1 Ci 
where Ci={(x,y)E[0,c]x[0,1/c] (xi x)2+(yiY)2<(x.-x)2+(y.-y)2, i#j}. As obtained 
earlier, Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium locations are given by 
[(x1'yl),(x2'y2)]=[(0,1/2c),(c,1/2c)] or [(c/2,0),(c/2,c)]. The welfare loss in either pair of 
locations i  the same and calculated as L=(c2+1/c2)/12.5 Obviously, this value increases
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as c(>1) gets large implying the greater loss in longer and more slender city. 
     On the other hand, the social optimum locations are easily calculated by 
differentiating (7) with respect to xi and yi respectively, and are given by 
[(xl'yl)'(x2'y2)]=[(c/4,1/2c),(3c/4,1/2c)] for c>1. The welfare loss is given by 
,C=(c2/4+1/c2)/12. As before, this is also an increasing function of c. Comparing these 
two values of C, we can say that the welfare loss of Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium 
locations is 1.6 to 4 times as large as that of the social optimum locations, and that the loss 
ratio increases as the rectangle becomes long and slender. The welfare loss is 1.6 times in 
the square case, and 4 times with c infinite. The latter value becomes identical to that in 
the one-dimensional model, where the consumer distribution is uniform over a line 
segment. 
     The reason for the smaller gap between the optimum and equilibrium in the 
two-dimensional model would be understood in the following manner. Since the 
transportation cost is a square of the Euclidian distance, it can be decomposed into a 
square of the horizontal distance (xi x)2 and a square of the vertical distance (yl y)2. 
Integrating the former over C1E(R2 is equivalent to that over ClE[R. However, there xists 
the other component of the distance cost (yi=y)2 in the two-dimensional model. Since 
y1=y2 =1/2c are common i case of optimum and equilibrium, integration (y1• y)2 over 
C1EER2 in each case yields the same value. That is, whereas the loss ratio in the horizontal 
direction is 4 times, that in the vertical direction is one time. Putting the two components 
together, the loss ratio in the two-dimensional model becomes less than 4 times, which is 
the case for one-dimensional model. This opens the general question of applicability of the 
one-dimensional models to two-dimensional problems. 
     Finally, we note that the price competition in duopoly is so fierce that firms have to 
locate far apart in Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium, resulting in greater loss of welfare than 
the social optimum configuration. This is common to both dimensional cases.
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
     Throughout this paper, we have assumed that in two-dimensional plane there are 
two firms competing in location first and then in mill price under the quadratic 
transportation cost function of distance. Applying Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), we showed 
first that a unique Nash price equilibrium exists on a two-dimensional space for any pair of 
firm locations if the consumer distribution isuniform and is a convex set. 
      Second, we proved that if the convex set is given by any rectangle, then neither 
firm locates at the interior egion in Nash two-stage (location then price) games. That is, 
the price competition which keeps their locations apart dominates the location competition 
which brings them near. This would explicate actual locational behavior of retail firms 
such as supermarkets which sell mostly identical commodities. Furthermore, we showed in 
the rectangular case that each firm locates at the midpoint of one side opposite to each 
other in Nash location equilibrium, and that multiple location equilibria exist when the 
rectangle is close to a square while a unique location equilibrium exists when the rectangle 
is long and slender (Proposition 2). It should be emphasized that although the price 
competition is so fierce that firms do not locate in the interior region, they do not 
necessarily locate to maximize the distance between the two. A similar result is obtained 
by Neven and Thisse (1990) although they consider horizontal and vertical differentiation 
instead of two dimensions ofhorizontal differentiation. We may interpret the result in a 
context of product characteristics space that firms maximize product differentiation in one 
characteristic while they minimize it in the other characteristic. 
    Third, we identified three factors in firms' location choice: (a) farther location to 
relax (Bertrand) price competition; (b) closer location to acquire customers; and (c) 
location which reduces the number of marginal customers. Factors a and b are frequently 
stated in the literature and hence need no explanation here. Factor c, on the other hand, 
never appears in one-dimensional models, but should be taken into account in analyzing 
two-dimensional models. This is because the number of marginal consumers, which is
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related to intensity of the price competition, varies according to their locations in a 
two-dimensional case, but not in a one-dimensional case. To put it plainly, firms can 
raise prices and hence profits when there are few marginal customers that firms want to 
acquire further (Remark 1). 
     Fourth, we modified the game of Nash location and Nash price to that of 
Stackelberg location and Nash price in Section 5. We obtained a unique Stackelberg 
location equilibrium for any rectangular (except square) uniform distribution of consumers 
(Proposition 3). Comparing it with the Nash one, we showed that the sequential choice of 
location is more desirable for the duopolistic firms than the simultaneous choice of location. 
     Finally, we computed the welfare loss defined by the sum of the transportation costs 
in the cases of Nash location equilibrium, Stackelberg location equilibrium and the social 
optimum for both one-dimensional space and two-dimensional space. We showed that the 
welfare loss of equilibrium locations in two-dimensional space is less than that in 
one-dimensional space. This casts some doubts on the use of one-dimensional models in 
evaluating the welfare loss of two-dimensional problems.
APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1 
     There are four cases below corresponding to Figure 2 (i)-(iv). 
Case (i) [c<xa, O<xb<c, 1/c<ya, 0<yb<1/c] 
     The profits are respectively given by 
          ri1 = pl[1-(c-xb)2/2a] and II2 = p2(c-xb)2/2a. 
Calculating the first-order conditions of 8111/apt=0 and a112/0p2=0, wehave 
  pi =2a(x2xl)[1/(c-xb)_(c-xb)/2a] and p2=(x2 x1l)(c-xb). 




                               * x2 xl 
                        112 = (c-xb)3. 
                          2a 
Differentiating this with respect to x2, 
* 
            81I2 
- (c-xb)3 x2 x1(cx3 - 3                                    aa x2 x1 (c-x2 axb                    -~b) b) (A2) 
           8x2 2a 2a ax2 2a ax2 
The partial derivatives ofthe RHS in (A2) are given by 
                as _a °~xb 1 x 2 +c-2xb                  - and - 
ax2 x2x1 ° 2 x2 x1 2+a/ (c xb) 
The latter is obtained by substituting the prices of (Al) and the values of (x,y)=(xb,l/c) 
into equation (1), and applying the implicit heorem to it. (A2) is then rewritten as 
        an2 (c-xb)2 3 (x2 +c-2x) (c-xb ) [ a-(c x b ] 
               - - )2                   2(c-xb) > 
        ax2 20 2+a/ (c-xb) a[2+a/(c-xb) ] 
            > (c -x b) 2xb             _ > 0 for all x2<c. 
           a[2+a/ (c-xb) 2 ] 
The first inequality is implied by x2<c, and the second is followed from 
a=(c-xb)/(1/c-yb)>c(c-xb). Note that if a-f+oo, then x1-'x2, which leads to xb<0, i.e., 
a-'oo does not correspond to case (i). 
     Similarly, we can show alI2/ay2>0 for all Y2< 1/c. Hence, firm 2 does not locate 
inside the rectangle, but rather locates at the corner (c,l/c) in this market division case. 
Case (ii) [0<xb<xa<c, 1/ <ya, yb<0] 
     Each profit is given by 
         III = pl(xa+xb)/2c and II2 = p2[1-(xa+xb)/2c]. 
Calculating ar11/apt=0 and 0112/apt=0, we get 
                                 * 2 
                      II2= 2 1(2c-x09 xb) . 
                         2c 
Differentiating this with respect to x2) we have 
               09112 2c-x
09 xb 
                     [4c/3+x 1/3x2+a(y1+Y2-1 /c)/3] 
             ax2 2c 
                               17
                    2c-xa xb 
                > [c-a/c] > 0 for all x2<c. 
                  6c 
The first inequality is followed from x2<c and x1,y1,y2 > 0; and the second is due to the 
fact that the absolute value of the slope of equation (1) is greater than or equal to that of 
the diagonal of the rectangle, i.e., I-1/al >1/c2. 
* 
     Next, differentiating 112 with respect to y2, we get 
                      an2 2c-xa xb 
                             (1/c-2y2) = 0. 
                  0y2 3c 
Therefore, the optimal location of firm 2 is the mid point of one side (c,1/2c) in case (ii). 
Case (iii) [c<xa, xb<0, 0<yb<ya<1/c] 
     Similar computation asin case (ii), we obtain that 
         * * 
    ant all2 
    ax = c(2/c-ya yb)(c-2x2)/3 = 0 and a > 0 for all y2<1/c. 
      2 y2 
That is, the optimal location of firm 2 is the midpoint of one side (c/2,1/c). 
Case (iv) [O<xa<c, xb<O, 0<yb<1/c, yb<0] 
                                              * * 
   Similar calculations as incase (i) yield x111/a1< 0 for all x1>0, and a1ll/ay1<0 
for all yl>0.. Thus, the optimal location of firm 1 is the corner (0,0). 
• Proof of Lemma 2 
     Let (xl,yl)=(0,0) and c>1 without loss of generality. We will compute the 
equilibrium profits of firm 2 corresponding to the four cases appeared in Lemma 1. 
Case (i) 
                                   * * 
     From Lemma 1(i), we have (x2,y2)=(c,1/c) iff c=1. (If c#1, case(i) does not occur.) 
The corresponding profit is II2 =1/2. 
Case (ii) 
                                      * * 
     From Lemma 1(ii), we have (x2,y2) _ (c,1/2c). The corresponding profit is
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11 =(12c+1/c3)2/288>169/288 since c>1. 
Case (iii) 
    From Lemma 1(iii), we have (x2,y2)=(c/2,1/c) and II2iii=(12/c+c3)2/288< 
169/288 since c>1. 
Case (iv) 
  Calculating 8H2/8x2=0 and 81I2/o0y2=0, and substituting x1=y1=0, we get 
                 2(xa 2)(2+a/xa) + 2 - 2xa =0, (A3) 
               (xa/a-2ax2)(2+a/xa) + 1/xa +ax2 =0. (A4) 
Subtracting (A4) from (A3) multiplied by a, we have 
                  (a2-1)(1/a+l/xa) = 0. 
Thus, a should be unity in equilibrium in case (iv), and so x2=y2' 
     Moreover, using 8II1/ep1=0, 8II2/8p2=0 and the definition of xa) we obtain 
                           x2 = 2xa -1/xa. (A5) 
From (A3) and (A5), we finally get x2=y2=( 33-3)/ 33+2 and II2iv= (207-33N33)/323 
for c<+2/( 33-3). For c> 33+2/( 33-3), we have x*                                          2=1/c, which does not satisfy 
the first-order condition. This mplies that II2iv for c> 33+2/(33-3) is smaller than 
II2iv for c< 33+2/( 33-3). 
     Comparing the above four values of H2, we conclude that II*ii is the largest. 
• Proof of Lemma 3 
    Let (x1,y1)=(0,1/2c), where cE(O,co) without loss of generality. Similar to the 
previous lemma, we compute the equilibrium profits of firm 2 for the four cases. 
Case (i) 
    If this is the case, firm 2 locates at (c,1/c) from Lemma 1(i). The condition of Yb>0 
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is satisfied if c<(7/12)1/4, and the condition of xb>0 is satisfied if c>(5/12)1/4. That is, 
1121=[c2+1/4c2+ /(c2+1/4c2)2+16]3/512 iff cE((5/12)1/4,(7/12)1/4). Otherwise, case(i) 
is not applied. This result is valid too when firm 2 locates at (c,0). 
Case (ii) 
    From Lemma 1(ii), firm 2 locates at (c,1/2c), and earns the profit of 112ii=c2/2. Of 
course, the conditions of 0<xa,xb<c are satisfied for all c>O since xa=xb=c/2. 
Case (iii) 
    From Lemma 1(iii), firm 2 locates at (c/2,1/c). Its profit is given by 
H*iii=(c3+5/c)2/144 iff c<1. This result also applies when firm 2 locates at (c/2,0). 
Case (iv) 
     This case does not occur because of the following reason. xb<c holds for 
c>(7/12)1/4, and yb<1/c holds for c<(5/12)1/4. This means that both xb<c and yb<1/c are 
not simultaneously atisfied when locations of the two firms are (0,1/2c) and (c,l/c). 
    Consider first the comparison between 1121 and 11211 for all cE((5/12)1/4,(7/12)1/4) 
since 1121 is defined only within this interval. As 1121 and 112ii are ncreasing for all 
cE((5/12)1/4,(7/12)1/4), and as 1121 at c=(7/12) 1/4 is strictly less than 11211 at 
c=(5/12)1/4, we conclude 112ii>112i for all cE((5/12)1/4,(7/12)1/4). That is, we can drop 
case (i) as a candidate for firm 2's best locational reply, which gives a proof of the former 
part of Lemma 3. 
    The latter part of Lemma 3 c n be shown by comparing 112ii w th 112iii forc<1. 
Taking the root and subtracting, we have fi-fi'= 2 (c4-6,tj 2c2+5)/(12c), which is
zero atc0N0.798(<1). Consequently, we obtain 11-H for cjco, which gives a proof f 
the latter part.
Proof of Proposition 2
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     From Lemmas 1 and 2, we know that one firm should locate at a midpoint of one 
side. 
(a) c<co 
     Suppose firm 1 locates at (0,1/2c). Then, firm 2 will locate at (c/2,1/c) from 
Lemma 3. Conversely, however, (0,1/2c) of firm 1's location isnot the best reply against 
(c/2,1/c) of firm 2's location due to the following reason. If-we rotate. therectangle by7r/2, 
the side lengths become 1/c by c, and, co is replaced with 1/co, which. is of course greater 
than co. Hence, the best reply of firm 1 is. not (0,1/2c), but (c/2,0) from Lemma 3. On the 
other hand, if firm 1 locates at (c/2,0), then firm 2 locates at (c/2,1/c) due to symmetry. 
(b) o<c<1 
     If firm 1 locates at (0,1/2c), then firm 2 locates at (c,1/2c) from Lemma 3. By 
symmetry, the reverse is also true. Similarly, if firm 1 locates at.. (c/2,0), then firm 2 
locates at (c/2,1/c), and the reverse is true too. 
Proof of Lemma 4 
     Without losing enerality, assume c>1. 
Case (ii) 
* 
     Differentiating 11,11 with respect o x2, we have 
             *ii 
           aII 1 
- xa+xb. 3 - x + -y2_Y1 + 2c - Y2 Y1                                       y1y2) 
          ax 6 c 1 c(x x) x x 
           2 2 1 2 1 
                           Y Y                  >_ xa+xb 3x2 Lx x + + - 2' 1 c 2x--c 
                6c 2 1 c .x -x ( Y1 Y2)                    (2 1) 
since (y2 y1)/(x2 x1)<c2. As y ,y <1/c, the last term in the brackets is nonnegative, and 
                     1 2 
hence 8II1 /oAx2>0. If the equality were to hold, then x1=x2=0, which does not occur in 
case (ii). Thus, we conclude aR1 /r3x2>0. 
     Next, differentiating II*1ii with respect to y2, we obtain
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                       ar1111 xa+xb 
a                       Y2 3 
This means that nlOy2~0 for y2<1/2c. 
Case (iii) 
     The same operation as above yields all/O >=0 for x ~c/2, and ai*y >0                              1 2< 2< 1111/0 
2 Case (iv) 
     Differentiating H 11v w th respect to x2and manipulating, we have 
            ari1iv (x2 x1)2xa[3x2+2(1 xaya)/Ya] 
                      - 
2 >0              ax2 2 (y2 Y1) [2 (x2-x 1)+(Y2 Y1) /xa] 
since xaya<1 and x2>x1. [x1=x2 does not occur in case(iv)]. 
    all iv/ay2>0 can beshown by similar c lculations. 
Proof of Lemma 5 
     As the midpoint and the corner are the only possibilities for firm 2, it suffices to 
prove that the former is preferred to the latter for all c. So, consider case (i), where firm 2 
necessarily locates at a corner 0(0,0).6 
     Then, the maximum profit that firm 1 could obtain is (207-330/32 from Lemma 
2(iv) (with permutation of firm indices). On the other hand, if firm 1 located at the 
midpoint of the short side, then firm 2 would locate at the opposite midpoint of the short 
side, and hence firm 1 earns the profit that is max{c2/2,1/2c2} from Lemma 3(ii). 
Comparing these profits, it might be possible for firm 2 to locate at a corner only when 
cE(c11,c1), where c1 (207-33 33)/16-1.05. 
     Now, if firm 2 locates at 0 in Figure 3, then 
            ya = 1 [x1 + y1 + (x1+y1)2+32x1y1] ~ c 
                     8x1 
is necessary tohold so that case (iv) applies. That is, the location of firm 1 is in C2, where 
    C2 = {(x1,Y1) I (x1+c)2+(y1-2/c)2<c2+4/c2, c/2<x1<c, 1/2c<y1<1/c, y1<x1}. 
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The last inequality does not lose generality due to the symmetric nature of rectangles. In 
other words, the case of y1>x1 can be similarly shown by interchanging c with c-1 in the 
proof below. Thus, confining firm 1's location to C2 (which is the shaded area in Figure 3), 
and limiting the range of one side to (c11,c1), wewill prove that for any firm 1's location 
within the shaded area, firm 2 is sure to locate at A(0,1/2c), but not at 0(0,0). 
                        [Figure 3 about here] 
(2) For c>1 
     As x1>1 does not satisfy the first inequality in C1 for c>1, we can limit the range of 
x1 to [c/2,1]. From (5) in Lemma 4, firm 2's profit at A is smaller if firm 1 is at 
R(x1,1/2c) rather than at P(xl,yl), i.e., for yl>1/2c, 
         112 2 ii(x1,y1,0,1/2c) > 112 211(x1 ,1/2c,0,1/2c) = xl(x +2c)2. (A6) 
                                        18c 1 
On the other hand, from (6) in Lemma 4, firm 2's profit at 0 is larger if firm 1 is at 
Q(xl,xl) rather than at P(xl,yl), i.e., for yl<xl, 
             11*lv(x ,y )0,0) < II*iv(x ,x .,0,0) = x1(x + x2+8)3. (A7) 
            2 1 1 2 1 1 128 1 1 
     By comparing (A6) with (A7), we can say that A is preferred to 0 by firm 2, [i.e., 
II 211(xl,y1,0,1/2c)> 1121v(xl,y1,0,0)] if b(xl)>0 for all x1EC1 and cE[l,cl), where 
                0(xl) = x1 + 2c - 3%(x1+3)3/2/8. 
Since a simple calculation yields that b"(xl)<0, 0'(1/2)<0 and b(1)>0, we have O(xl)>0, 
which means that A is preferred to0 by firm 2. 
(2) For c<1 
     We divide the range of xl into the following two intervals. 
[2a] 1/2c<x1(1/2c+1/4 
    As 0"(x1)<0, b'(1/2)<0 and ii(1/2c+1/4)>0 VcE(c11,1), we have O(xl)>0, 
implying that A is preferred to 0 by firm 2 for x1E[1/2c,1/2c+1/4]. 
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[2b] 1/2c+1/4<xl<c 
     Consider the line y=x-1/4, which is shown to be outside C1 for x>1/2c+1/4. 
Therefore, again from (5) in Lemma 4, firm 2's profit at A is smaller if firm 1 is at 
S(xl,xl-1/4) rather than at P(xl,yl), i.e., 
      B2ii(x1,y1,0j/2c) > B2ii(xl)x1-1/4,0,1/2c) 
                 = 1 [2x1+(2c-1/2-1/c)x1+(1/16+1/4c+1/4c2)]2. (A8) 
                       18cx1 
By comparing (A7) with (A8), we can say that A is preferred to 0 by firm 2, [i.e., 
B211(xl'y1,0,1/2c)> II21V(xl,y1,0,0)] if t~(xl)>0 for all x1EC1 and cE(c 1,1), where 
1 
      0(xl) =2x1+(2c-1/2-1/c)x1+1/16+1/4c+1/4c2-3~x1(x1+3)3/2/8. 
After some computations, we get q5"'(xl)<0, q5"(1)>0, 5'(1)<0 and 0(1)>0 for all 
cE(c11,1). Hence, g5(xl)>O, which means that A is preferred to 0 by firm 2 for 
x1E[1/2c+1/4,c]. 
Proof of Proposition 5
     According to Lemma 5, firm 2 (the follower) necessarily chooses to locate at the 
midpoint. Knowing this and from Lemma 1, firm 1 would locate at a midpoint or a corner. 
     Assume c> 1 without losing generality. If firm 1 chooses to locate at (0 , 0) , then 
firm 2 chooses (c,1/2c) from Lemma 2, and B1=(3c-1/4c3)2/18. On the other hand, if 
firm 1 locates at (0,1/2c), which is the midpoint of the short side, then firm 2 chooses 
(0/2c) from Lemma 3, and so 111=c2/2. Obviously, the latter profit is greater than the 
former. Moreover, if firm 1 were to locate at the midpoint of the long side, it is definitely 
inferior than that of the short side. 
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i For example, suppose the transportation cost is proportional to a power of distance. 
Then, the nonexistence of price equilibrium occurs for any power except 2 when firms 
locate sufficiently close. 
2 This is also true for the case of uniform ellipse distributions of consumers. 
According to our numerical analysis, the two-stage Nash equilibrium locations are 
computed as: 
              * *-* 
      (xl,y1,x2,y2) _ (a,0,-a,0) for 1<a/b<1.36, 
                 _ (a,0,-a,0) or (O,b,O, b) for a/b>1.36, 
where the ellipse is given by x2/a2+y2/b2=1. 
3 We also proved that the exclusion of interior location holds under any uniform 
ellipse distribution of consumers. In case of a disc, the two-stage Nash equilibrium 
locations are shown to be opposite points on the circumference. Proofs of these results are 
omitted here to save space, but are contained in Tabuchi (1990). 
4 Since both Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium locations are found to be symmetric, 
the prices are same, and hence consumers necessarily go to their nearest firm. 
5 Although there is no difference between Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium locations 
in terms of the welfare loss, the producer's surplus (i.e., the profit) differs between the two 
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as is seen in Section 5.
6 To simplify mathematical 
(c,l/c) in this proof.
computations, firm 2's location is set to (0,0) instead of
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Possible location of firm 1 (the leader) if firm 2 
(the follower) were to locate at the corner 0
